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THE ULTIMATE COMPANY TOWN: WADING IN THE DIGITAL
MARSH OF SECOND LIFE
Jason S. Zack*
Hiro is approaching the Street. It is the Broadway, the Champs E lys~es of
the Metaverse. It is the brilliantly lit boulevard that can be seen, minia-
turized and backward, reflected in the lenses of his goggles. It does not
really exist. But right now, millions of people are walking up and down
. 1
It.
INTRODUCTION
Second Life2 has become the Internet's preeminent "virtual
world," a nearly perfect, early implementation of the Metaverse, as
imagined by Neal Stephenson fifteen years ago in his science fiction
classic, Snow Crash.3  Second Life's 10.2 million citizens interact via
digital representations, called avatars, in a persistent, constantly ex-
panding computerized landscape (currently covering more than
65,000 acres) . Second Lifers create and own virtual property and
goods, exchanging currency-Linden dollars-that has value in the
"real world" and which is traded via a public exchange called the
LindeX. As of October 20, 2007, the Linden dollar (L$) was selling
* J.D. Candidate (2008), University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S. 1995, University of
Florida; Ph.D. 2000, University of Maryland, College Park. Special thanks to Professor
Theodore Ruger, Professor Wendell Pritchett, George Gerstein, Stefan Carpenter, and
Matthew Borthwick for their helpful comments during preparation of this Article, and to
Josh Spear, for showing me the many possibilities of Second Life and the rest of the digi-
tal world.
1 NEAL STEPHENSON, SNOW CRASH 23 (Bantam Books 2000) (1992).
2 http://www.secondlife.com. See generally MICHAEL RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., SECOND LIFE:
THE OFFICIAL GuIDE (2007) (providing a comprehensive overview of Second Life, includ-
ing its history, architecture, and culture, along with tips forjoining the community).
3 STEPHENSON, supra note 1.
4 Second Life, Economic Statistics, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy-stats.php (last
visited Oct. 21, 2007) (reflecting Second Life statistics as of midnight on Oct. 20, 2007).
5 Second Life, The World, http://secondlife.com/whatis/world.php (last visited Oct. 21,
2007).
6 Second Life, Terms of Service, General Provisions, http://secondlife.com/corporate/-
tos.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2007). Note that Second Life changed its Terms of Service
to make arbitration optional after a federal court recently held a previous mandatory ar-
bitration clause to be unconscionable. See infra text accompanying note 90.
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at an exchange rate of L$266 to one U.S. dollar (US$), and the
equivalent of more than US$1 million worth of transactions per day
were taking place in Second Life.7 This robust economy has attracted
the attention of Congress, which has begun to examine the tax con-
sequences of income earned in Second Life and other virtual worlds.8
But it has also gained the attention of entrepreneurs, politicians,
educators, entertainers, and individuals of all varieties around the
world, who seek to capitalize on the limitless opportunities that exist
in a virtual world.
Second Life has residents, 9 an economy, and a geography (and
topography). Citizens have property rights' (a feature that sets it
apart from other virtual worlds), and now that people have begun to
"make a living" there, it can be said that people have begun living in
Second Life, with some investing far more time and energy in their
virtual lives than in their physical ones." The extent to which Second
Life becomes a true lived-in community will only increase as technol-
ogy improves and more activities traditionally reserved for the physi-
cal world take place there.
Because Second Life is housed on servers based in San Francisco,
the question then arises whether its citizens are entitled to core rights
7 Second Life, Economic Statistics: Graphs, http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy-
graphs.php (last visited October 21, 2007) (providing a daily LindeX market history);
Second Life, supra note 2 ("$US Spent Last 24h: $1,199, 488.").
8 See Adam Pasick, Virtual Economies Attract Real-World Tax Attention, REUTERS (London),
Oct. 16, 2006, reprinted in eWEEK, available at 2006 WLNR 18033251 (describing interest
taken by the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress in virtual economies); see
alsoJonathan V. Last, Dungeons, Dragons, and Taxes; The IRS Is Eyeing Your Hard-Earned Vir-
tual Gold, WKLY. STANDARD, Jan. 8, 2007, at 15 (noting that the Joint Economic Commit-
tee began researching virtual economies in October 2006 and "is expected to issue a re-
port early in 2007"). As of October 2007, the committee has yet to issue any report.
9 Second Life refers to its participants as "residents." See supra note 2 ("Second Life is a 3D
online digital world imagined and created by its residents[.]").
10 Note that according to the Terms of Service, discussed infra note 39, residents have intel-
lectual property rights to the things they create in Second Life; whether they have rights in
any actual data or the assets of their accounts is still uncertain. See also Second Life, IP
Rights, http://secondlife.com/whatis/ipfights.php (last visited October 21, 2007)
("Linden Lab's Terms of Service agreement recognizes Residents' right to retain full in-
tellectual property protection for the digital content they create in Second Life, including
avatar characters, clothing, scripts, textures, objects and designs. This right is enforceable
and applicable both in-world and offiine, both for non-profit and commercial ventures.
You create it, you own it-and it's yours to do with as you please.").
11 See Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck, Introduction to THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW,
GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 3, 3 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds.) (2006)
("[M]any of the 20 to 30 million regular participants [in virtual worlds] now spend more
time in virtual environments than they do at their real-world jobs or engaged with their
real-world communities .. ").
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guaranteed under the California or U.S. Constitutions, to the same
extent as residents of privately owned towns or common interest
communities.
Only "state actors" are required to provide for rights guaranteed
by the U.S. Constitution, and although the landmark case of Marsh v.
Alabama12 established that a privately owned "company town" could
be considered a state actor, the definition of state actor has been nar-
rowly construed over the ensuing years.
In this Comment, I will argue that Second Life should be required
to guarantee its residents protections guaranteed by the United States
Constitution. First, I will describe Second Life and the extent to
which it truly represents a municipality for its residents, and how, at
the very least, it represents a true common interest community. I will
show that Second Life is perhaps the quintessential company town for
its citizens, providing for "substantially all of the functions of gov-
ernment"'3 that would be offered by a municipality, so that Marsh
should apply. Second, I will show that even if Second Life does not
qualify as a state actor, it should be required to provide for rights
guaranteed by the California Constitution, because recent decisions
hold that common interest communities do not necessarily need to
be state actors to be covered under state constitutions. 14 Finally, I will
offer recommendations for operators and residents of virtual com-
munities, emphasizing that those who operate virtual worlds which
seek to mimic the real world and have a real economy should be pre-
pared to provide certain constitutional rights to their citizens, includ-
ing those citizens who do not physically reside in the United States.
I. WELCOME TO THE METAVERSE: A VISIT TO SECOND LIFE
Second Life is a virtual world. Unlike the massively multiplayer
online role-playing games (MMORPGs) that are its progenitors, Sec-
ond Life is not typically portrayed as a game or pastime.5 There are
12 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
13 N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 769 (N.J.
1994).
14 See id. at 769 (noting that California's free speech clause protects citizens from both state
and private action (citing Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal.
1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980))).
15 See Danny Bradbury, Whole New World Awaits on the Web: Visitors to Second Life Can Walk, Fly,
Dress Up, Play Music, Visit Clubs and Make Real Money, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 7, 2006, at S10
("[Dion't call Second Life a game, warn executives of Linden Labs [sic], the company
behind the system. They argue that while you can play games in Second Life, calling the
environment itself a game is misleading.").
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no points, objectives, or quests. Instead, it is an alternate reality
where people may assume new identities, trade in real and personal
property, and interact with others without any boundaries. To be
sure, there are recreational activities in Second Life (e.g., casinos and
competitions), but for others it is simply a place to accumulate
wealth, establish social relationships, or just explore and experience
new sights and sounds. It is an immersive world that resembles our
day-to-day experience, but it is an artificial construction. Second Life
currency may be spent on virtual goods and property, or exchanged
for money that is usable outside of Second Life.' 6 In some ways, it
sounds a lot like Las Vegas-but instead of being located in the de-
sert sands of Nevada, Second Life sits on a set of servers in California,
home of Linden Lab, Second Life's developers and proprietors.1
7
Briefly stated, Second Life and other virtual worlds are merely the
latest iteration of the multi-user domains (MUDs) that were first de-
veloped in the late 1970s.' The earliest MUDs were text-based ad-
ventures that could be experienced by users logged into workstations
at multiple locations on a computer network. Through a series of
commands, a user might direct his or her character to walk into a
room, whereupon the user would be presented with a written descrip-
tion of the room, which might note that another user's character was
present. At that point, the users could have a text-based conversation
(through their alter-ego characters), interact with elements in the
room, or move to an adjacent location, all synchronously (in real-
time). As Internet access speed increased and computer-processing
16 See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 2, at 212-49 (presenting a lengthy discussion of how
Second Life residents may go about making real-world money).
17 See Wired Travel Guide: Second Lie, WIRED, Oct. 2006, at 184 ("Location: 3,000-plus servers
at a data center in San Francisco"); see also Open .. ., Interview with Second Life's Philip
Rosedale, Part II, http://opendotdotdot.blogspot.com/2006/11/interview-with-second-
lifes-philip_28.html (Nov. 28, 2006, 13:28 EST) ("The second question, about laws reflect-
ing where servers are based, we just don't know. We're trying to be pretty smart about it,
but the company's here in the United States right now. Yeah, the servers could be in an-
other country, maybe that'll make the local laws apply differently on those servers .... "
(quoting Linden Lab CEO Philip Rosedale)); Daniel Terdiman, 'Second Life: Don't Worry,
We Can Scale, CNET NEWS.cOM, June 6, 2006, http://news.com.com/2102-1043_3-
6080186.html ("'Second Life' currently runs on 2,579 servers that use the dual-core Op-
teron chip produced by AMD. Each server is responsible for an individual 'sim,' or 16
acres of virtual 'Second Life' land.").
18 See, e.g., Beth Simone Noveck, The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 6-11 (2004) (de-
scribing the evolution and development of virtual worlds); see also F. Gregory Lastowka &
Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1, 14 (2004) (commenting on
how the idea of moving through an abstract, spatial representation is an ancient one,
found in any map or game or spoken myth).
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power improved over the subsequent fifteen to twenty years, allowing
for more complicated graphics, the basic MUD evolved into sophisti-
cated MMORPGS-complex, persistent environments that were de-
picted with stunning 3-D visuals. Not only could one read about the
character in front of him (operated by a stranger across the globe),
but one could see the character as well, whether he was gathering re-
sources, exploring, or killing monsters. Sony Online Entertainment's
EverQuest was one of the earliest examples of such a 3-D fantasy
realm,' 9 and similar fantasy games remain popular today (e.g., World
of Warcraft). 2 Eventually, some developers realized that this technol-
ogy could be broadened to create a virtual world that was not simply a
game to be played, but rather, a place in which people could interact,
work, and live. Enter Second Life, which first opened to the public in
2003.21
Second Life, although not the only virtual world, is the one that
has gained the most traction in both the media and business worlds
and is one virtual world likely to endure.2 The principle reason for
this may be that, unlike the other MMORPG "games" mentioned
above, Second Life requires no software purchase or monthly fees. 3
Although many of the concepts discussed here may also be applicable
to these other virtual communities, I will limit the discussion to Sec-
ond Life as a case example.
Just how much traction does Second Life have? Consider:
* Politicians have made appearances in Second Life to interact
with their constituents;
24
19 See Noveck, supra note 18, at 7-8 (noting that Everquest "launched in 1999 with a three-
dimensional perspective" and had nearly half a million subscribers in the U.S. by 2004).
20 See Press Release, Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., World of Warcraft Surpasses 9 Million
Subscribers Worldwide (July 24, 2007), available at http://www.blizzard.com/press/
070724.shtml.
21 Second Life, What Is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis/ (last visited Oct. 9,
2007); see also RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 2, at 6 (providing a history of Second Life's
conception and launch).
22 See, e.g., Bill Werde, Philip Rosedale: The Virtual World He Created with Second Life Is Making
Real Dollars-And Forever Changing Entertainment, BILLBOARD,Jan. 6, 2007, at 26 (noting, in
Billboard's "Best Bets 2007" issue, Second Life's profitability and exponential growth,
with the number of users doubling every seven months).
23 Although a monthly rent is charged to owners of virtual real estate, there is no fee to
maintain an identity in Second Life.
24 See, e.g., Dana Milbank, Do You Have a Question, Pixeleen Minstral, WASH. POST, Sept. 1,
2006, at A2 (discussing a visit to Second Life by Mark Warner, presidential candidate and
former governor of Virginia); Jonathan Mummolo, Politics: Pelosi in Pixels?, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 29 2007, at 16 ("Rep. George Miller of California appeared [in Second Life], fielding
questions via his avatar, which he described to Newsweek as having 'a big mop of gray
hair.'"); Kim Willsher, Volley of Exploding Pigs Launches Presidential Race in Cyber Space,
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* The Reuters news agency has a full-time correspondent in Sec-
ond Life;2 5
" Popular musical artists, like Duran Duran and Suzanne Vega,
have held concerts in Second Life;
26
" Harvard Law School held an entire course in Second Life, which
was open to the public;
27
" Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recently visited Second Life to discuss his new book;
2 8
* One Second Life resident is reported to have transformed
"$US9.95 into virtual assets worth at least $US1 million in real
money";2
9
" Major corporations have established storefronts and promoted
products in Second Life;30 and
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 28, 2007, at 35, available at 2007 WLNR 1655505 (de-
scribing Second Life as "a virtual battleground in the French presidential election, with
two of the main parties setting up headquarters"); The Social Web, John Edwards' Cam-
paign Enters Second Life, http://blogs.zdnet.com/social/?p=91 (Feb. 14, 2007, 7:10
PST) (reporting on the establishment of a virtual campaign headquarters for presidential
candidate John Edwards).
25 Andrew Adam Newman, The Reporter Is Real, but the World He Covers Isn't, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 2006, at C6 (describing how Adam Pasick, a Reuters technology reporter, will head up
Reuters' first virtual news bureau, filing articles "strictly about-and addressed to-" Sec-
ond Life players, via his Adam Reuters avatar).
26 Robert Andrews, Second Life Rocks (Literally), WIRED.COM, Aug. 15, 2006, http://www.
wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2006/08/71593.
27 CyberOne: Law in the Court of Public Opinion, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/
cyberone/ (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) (featuring a fascinating trailer video and mentioning
how enrollment in the course is open to the public via the "Harvard Extension School" in
Second Life).
28 Stephanie Francis Ward, Fantasy Life, Real Law: Travel into Second Life-The Virtual World
Where Lawyers Are Having Fun, Exploring Legal Theory and Even Generating New Business,
A.B.A.J., Mar. 2007, at 42 (reporting on lawyers who are entering Second Life to explore
legal theories or generate business, including Judge Posner, who views Second Life as a
"kind of laborator[y] for studying the emergence of rules").
29 Stephen Hutcheon, Virtual Property Queen Says Thanks a Million, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Nov. 27, 2006, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/biztech/virtual-property-queen-
reaps-the-rewards/2006/11/27/1164476080388.html (discussing a Chinese language
teacher's experience in becoming the first "Virtual World Millionaire").
30 See, e.g., IBM, Sears Unveil Virtual Store, INVESTREND, Jan. 9, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
369717 (announcing the unveiling of the "Sears Virtual Home Prototype" on IBM's pri-
vate island in Second Life, as well as noting the virtual showrooms of such other retailers
as Dell and Toyota); see also Living a Second Life, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2006, at 77 (discuss-
ing the Second Life forays of Toyota, the BBC, Sun Microsystems, Wells Fargo, and Star-
wood Hotels and Resorts); Linda Zimmer, How Viable Is Virtual Commerce? Businesses that
Understand the Potential of Second Life Are Finding Real-World Commercial Opportunities in the
Virtual Space, OPTIMIZE, Jan. 1, 2007, at 44, available at 2007 WLNR 54238 (highlighting
additional Second Life ventures by MTV, American Apparel, and Nissan).
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* Some companies, including Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard, and
Verizon, have begun to conductjob interviews in Second Life.3'
Although Second Life's "residents" still have a corporeal existence
and need to eat, sleep, pay their rent, et cetera, it has become appar-
ent that nearly all of one's non-physical activities have the potential to
be conducted in this virtual community. Some individuals work full
time in Second Life, selling virtual real estate (oxymoronic as that
may sound) or virtual personal goods (e.g., clothing, accessories,
tools, vehicles, hairstyles, even anatomical parts) for Linden dollars,
which are then exchanged on the LindeX for currency that may be
used to support the individual's physical needs.32 Although only a
relative few are living this sort of existence today (entirely dependent
upon Second Life activities), such arrangements are bound to in-
crease as technology improves and more people realize the opportu-
nities available in Second Life, opportunities that they may not have
with traditional work-life models. It may feel like science fiction, and
be distasteful to those of us who are used to our traditional lifestyles,
but it is not difficult to imagine a near future where much of our lives
are lived in virtual worlds. Why commute to an office when we can
simply strap on goggles and (once graphics and responsiveness im-
prove somewhat), "be" in the office?33 The same goes for attending a
movie, browsing the law library stacks, going to the mall, or even hav-
ing a romantic date.
Further evidence that Second Life is more like real life and less
like a game to its inhabitants may be seen in a lawsuit that recently
arose from an incident that occurred in the virtual world3 4 A Penn-
sylvania lawyer sued Linden Lab for $8,000 in restitution when the
company "unilaterally shut down his Second Life account, cutting off
31 Anjali Athavaley, A job Interview You Don't Have to Show Up for-Microsoft, Verizon, Others Use
Virtual Worlds to Recruit, WALL ST.J.,June 20, 2007, at Dl.
32 See, e.g., Julian Dibbell, The Life of the Chinese Gold Farmer, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, § 6
(Magazine), at 36 (chronicling the "$1.8 billion worldwide trade in virtual items").
33 See Meet Me in My Avatar's Office, CANBERRA TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
1668429 ("Employees of tomorrow will inhabit virtual worlds like Second Life to hold live
weekly meetings with co-workers, catch up over lunch with financial advisers and join
friends on virtual shopping excursions after work.").
34 Alan Sipress, In the Digital World, Rights Can Be Tenuous, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 1
2007, at 4 ("U.S. courts have heard several cases involving virtual-world property rights
but have yet to set a clear precedent clarifying whether people own the electronic goods
they make, buy or accumulate in Second Life and other online landscapes.").
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his access to a substantial portfolio of real estate and currency in the
virtual world."3' 5 In his complaint, the plaintiff states that:
Defendants' computer code was designed and intended to act like real
world property that requires the payment of U.S. Dollars to buy, own,
and sell that property and to allow for the conveyance of title and owner-
ship rights in that property separate and apart from the code itself, and
as such, Plaintiff's rights in the virtual property should be regulated and
36
protected like real world property.
So what makes Second Life so special? Why did it merit the first
lawsuit over virtual property and present a constitutional question,
when no other virtual worlds posed such issues previously?
There are "two key, unique differences" between Second Life and
other MMORPGs.37 First, it allows for complete creativity. 8 Second,
it grants property ownership rights to its residents.3 9 These two fea-
tures create the magical formula that raises constitutional questions
35 Kathleen Craig, Second Life Land Deal Goes Sour, WIRED.COM, May 18, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/gaming/virtualworlds/news/2006/05/
7 0909 ; see also Complaint,
Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., No. 06-08711 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. filed Oct. 4, 2006),
http://lawy-ers.com/BraggvLinden-Complaint.pdf; Miriam Hill, Real Suit over Virtual
Property: An Online World Confiscated His Empire, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 20, 2006, at Al
(summarizing Second Life and the Bragg case). The case was removed to federal court
where it withstood a motion by Linden to compel arbitration under the Terms of Service
Agreement, and to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Bragg v. Linden Research,
Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 2007). See also The Second Life Insider,
http://www.secondlifeinsider.com/tag/BraggVsLindenLab (last visited Nov. 16, 2007)
(chronicling the lawsuit). Ultimately, the case settled for an undisclosed sum. Technol-
lama, http://technollama.blogspot.com/2007/10/bragg-v-linden-labs.html (Oct. 19,
2007, 09:17 EST) (noting the settlement and presenting another point of view on the
case). Pleadings are also available for download at http://secondlife.typepad.com/.
36 Complaint, supra note 35, at 2.
37 Second Life: Frequently Asked Questions, http://secondlife.com/whatis/faq.php (last
visited Oct. 9, 2007).
38 See id. ("This world really is whatever you make it, and your experience is what you want
out of it.").
39 See id. (noting that users can "own" virtual land and "retain IP rights over their in-world
creations"); see also Second Life: Terms of Service § 3.2, http://secondlife.com/
corporate/tos.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2007) ("You retain copyright and other intellectual
property rights with respect to Content you create in Second Life, to the extent that you
have such rights under applicable law. However, you must make certain representations
and warranties, and provide certain license rights, forbearances and indemnification, to
Linden Lab and to other users of Second Life."). Although formal Second Life docu-
ments generally couch the rights as "intellectual property rights," which Linden is likely
to argue are restricted to traditional rights in copyright (reproduction, distribution, et
cetera), Second Life's CEO, Philip Rosedale, has made public statements noting that
residents can "own land" and have "a real piece of the future." Bragg, 487 F. Supp. 2d at
596. The Terms of Service, however, also state that "Linden Lab retains ownership of the
account and related data, regardless of intellectual property rights [the resident] may
have in content [the resident] create[s] or otherwise own[s]." Second Life: Terms of
Service § 3.3, supra.
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about Second Life, because, in many ways, those are two of the cen-
tral features characterizing the development of our country. Com-
plete creativity in a free market is, in essence, freedom to live. The
right to property and to the fruits of one's labor is one of the funda-
mental principles in the Lockean form of government that underpins
our Constitution.4° In fact, it has been said that property rights are
the bedrock of all of the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitu-
41tion.
Thus, there appears to be at least a theoretical basis for applying
such constitutional rights as the Freedom of Speech, Due Process,
and Equal Protection to residents of (and visitors to) Second Life.
But is Second Life "real" enough for its residents to qualify for the
protection of such rights? We must examine the circumstances un-
der which such rights have been deemed to apply (or not) to analo-
gous enterprises. Is Second Life like a privately owned town? Like a
common interest community? Or is it more like a shopping mall?
Does it matter? In the next Section, I will discuss how the Constitu-
tion applies to such entities.
II. STATE ACTION AND PUBLIC FUNCTION
In this Section, I summarize the current law regarding the state
action requirement and the public function doctrine, which deter-
mines when the Constitution may apply to private communities, like
Second Life, and other private forums (i.e., those not operated by a
government) where proprietors may seek to limit civil rights.
In general, the Constitution defines the relationship between citi-
zens and their government, not the relationships among private citi-
42
zens, or between citizens and private companies. In some cases,
40 See James S. Burling, Protecting Property Rights in Aquatic Resources After Lucas, in INVERSE
CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERNMENT LIABILITY 137, 139 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study, Sept. 30, 1993), available at C872 ALI-ABA 137 (Westlaw) (discussing "the close
connection between property rights and all of our other liberties").
41 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10 (1948) ("It cannot be doubted that among the civil
rights intended to be protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality in
the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers of that Amendment as an
essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the
Amendment was intended to guarantee.").
42 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 619 (1991) ("With a few excep-
tions... constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection do not apply
to the actions of private entities."); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883) ("[C]ivil
rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be im-
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however, companies can act like governments, either (a) due to the
extent of their control over private citizens, or (b) because of the na-
ture of the services they provide. These two features establish the
need for a doctrine to determine what constitutes "state action."
4
Typically, this discussion arises in the context of the civil rights that
should be available to private citizens who are under the control of,
or in contract with, other private entities that have control over them
and seek to restrict those rights.
In the seminal case of Marsh v. Alabama, a woman was charged
with criminal trespass for distributing religious materials in Chicka-
saw, Alabama, a suburb of Mobile that was entirely owned by the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation.5 Although this restriction on speech and
religion would clearly be unconstitutional under the First and Four-
teenth Amendments if Chickasaw were a municipality, the defendants
argued that in this situation the Constitution should not apply be-
cause the town was company owned. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
was unpersuaded6:
Whether a corporation or a municipality owns or possesses the town the
public in either case has an identical interest in the functioning of the
community in such manner that the channels of communication remain
free.... [T]he town of Chickasaw does not function differently from any other
town. The "business block" serves as the community shopping center and
is freely accessible and open to the people in the area and those passing
through. The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the
liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the pur-
poses of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one
here involved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing those
who attempt to distribute religious literature clearly violates the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.47
paired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of
laws, customs, orjudicial or executive proceedings.").
43 See generally JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 562-83 (5th ed. 2003) (reviewing the state action doctrine).
44 Because it is the most relevant to Second Life, I will focus my discussion on the "public
function" analysis of state action, but it is important to note that there are two other lines
of state action jurisprudence: the "significant involvement/joint participation" approach
of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 725 (1961), wherein the state
is interdependent with the offending private entity; and the "encouragement, authoriza-
tion and approval" approach of Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982), wherein a
state has had a direct or indirect role in promoting the private entity's actions.
45 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
46 Id. at 509 ("When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against
those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain
mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.").
47 Id. at 507-08 (emphasis added).
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Thus, a company-owned town is bound by the Fourteenth
Amendment when: (1) it functions as any other town, and (2) when
it is open to the public.
Like Chickasaw, Second Life is free and open to the public,4s and
although it is not a town that one can drive through, it is fast becom-
ing the country's leading virtual destination. A business trip or pro-
fessional conference may soon be equally likely to require a visit to
Second Life as to New York or Toledo (and may even be safer and
more enjoyable). Furthermore, Second Life's proprietors provide
virtually all of the functions that a municipality would provide for a
typical town: it maintains the infrastructure, provides for security, et
cetera. In sum, it is arguable that Marsh should apply to Second Life.
I will return to this argument in Section IV.
On the other hand, state action jurisprudence has been apprecia-
bly curtailed over the years since Marsh, raising questions as to its ap-
plicability to Second Life. Constitutional rights may be more limited
when the private entity is more commercial and less municipal in na-
ture. For example, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, the Supreme Court held that picketers protesting
the staffing of non-union employees at a shopping mall were pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 49 The Court held the mall was the
"functional equivalent" of the Chickasaw business district in Marsh
because "[t]he general public ha[d] unrestricted access to the mall
property."'° However, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, the Court found that
there was no speech protection for Vietnam War protesters at a
shopping mall because, unlike in Logan Valley, the war protest was un-
related to the shopping center, and protesters had the opportunity to
take their protest elsewhere and still reach their intended audience."'
Thereafter, in Hudgens v. NLRB, the Court clarified that Lloyd had
overruled Logan Valley, and held that it was irrelevant whether the
48 As mentioned elsewhere in this Article, there is no charge to download the Second Life
software, initiate a basic membership, enter Second Life, or create and maintain an iden-
tity there, although there is a monthly fee for landowners. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra
note 2, at 20-21 (describing the Second Life fee structure); id. at 37-38. (outlining land-
use costs).
49 391 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1968).
50 Id. at 318, 325 ("'The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by
the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it.' Logan Valley Mall is the functional equivalent
of a 'business block' and for First Amendment purposes must be treated in substantially
the same manner." (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506)).
51 407 U.S. 551, 561-67 (1972).
Dec. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
protected activity was related to the shopping center. 5 The only
thing that matters, it appeared, was whether the private entity is the
"functional equivalent" of a municipality, and self-contained shop-
ping centers are not.53 Hence, if Second Life were merely a "virtual
shopping center," it should not be considered a state actor and its
residents need not be afforded constitutional rights. It is readily ar-
guable, however, that Second Life leans more toward the municipal-
ity side of the commercial-municipal continuum because, unlike a
shopping mall, it does not exist for the sole, express purpose of sell-
ing goods. Rather, Second Life has the same purpose as any munici-
pality: to be a place where people can live, work, and exchange ideas
and property. Second Life's proprietors "st[an]d in the shoes of the
State," and "perform[] the full spectrum of municipal powers" for its
residents.
54
The Supreme Court had earlier added another contour to the
state action doctrine in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., wherein it
explained that state action is only present when a private entity exer-
cises "powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State., 5  The
Court found that operation of a public utility or other business regu-
lated by the state did not in itself qualify as a traditional public func-
tion, and refused to expand the definition of state action to include
any private actor operating for the public good.56 Nevertheless, com-
pany towns still qualify as state actors and Marsh is still good law.57
Thus, if a private entity is deemed a state actor by virtue of its func-
tions (functionally equivalent to the business district of a town, or
traditionally and exclusively provided by government), it will be pro-
hibited from abridging liberties guaranteed to individuals by the
United States Constitution.
52 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976).
53 Id. at 519-20 (reasoning that, "[i]f a large self-contained shopping center is the func-
tional equivalent of a municipality, as Logan Valley held, then the First and Fourteenth
Amendments would not permit control of speech within such a center to depend upon
the speech's content," and because Lloyd did permit the control of speech, a shopping
center must not be the functional equivalent of a municipality).
54 Id. at 519.
55 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
56 Id. at 354 ("Doctors, optometrists, lawyers, Metropolitan [Edison], and Nebbia's upstate
New York grocery selling a quart of milk are all in regulated businesses, providing argua-
bly essential goods and services, 'affected with a public interest.' we do not believe that
such a status converts their every action, absent more, into that of the State.").
57 See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991) (citing Marsh as exem-
plifying performance of a traditional government function); see also Brentwood Acad. v.
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 313 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing Marsh as an example of a public facility "giv[ing] rise to a finding of state action").
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But what if the entity does not rise to the level of "state actor" un-
der federal law? The private actor might still be legally restricted
from abridging liberties guaranteed to those over whom it has con-
trol under the relevant state constitution. s Many state courts follow
the federal approach to state action, 59 but some 60 have held, without
objection from the U.S. Supreme Court, that constitutional liberties
may apply even if a private entity would not be considered a state ac-
tor under the federal approach. 6 ' For example, in PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the California Su-
preme Court's ruling that a privately owned shopping mall was in fact
required to allow the reasonable exercise of free speech by mall visi-
62
tors under California's Constitution.
It is readily arguable that Second Life exists within California ter-
ritory, given that the servers are housed there and Second Life resi-
dents must "travel" to this location on a server in California every
58 See generally David Pickle, Comment, State Court Approaches to the State Action Requirement:
Private Rights, Public Values, and Constitutional Choices, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 495 (1991) (re-
viewing differences between federal and state approaches to the state action require-
ment).
59 See, e.g., State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. 1999) (holding that the protec-
tions of the Minnesota constitution "are triggered only by state action" and no affirmative
rights are accorded to citizens against each other).
60 See, e.g., Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), affd, 447 U.S.
74 (1980) (concluding that sections 2 and 3 of article I of the California Constitution pro-
tect "speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the
centers are privately owned"); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v.J.M.B. Realty, 650
A.2d 757, 770 (N.J. 1994) (noting that "the NewJersey Constitution's right of free speech
is broader than the right against governmental abridgement of speech found in the First
Amendment" and holding that private shopping malls must allow leafletting and related,
nondisruptive exercises of free speech rights guaranteed under the New Jersey Constitu-
tion); W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 485 A.2d 1, 5 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that "the [free expression) provisions of Article I, section 7 [of
the Pennsylvania Constitution] do not reach the acts of purely private actors").
61 DANIEL A. FARBER, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 239 (3d ed. 2003) ("[I]n several
states.., state constitutional protections have been held applicable to what the U.S. Su-
preme Court would consider private controversies.").
62 447 U.S. 74, 80 (holding that such a requirement did not violate the shopping center
owner's due process rights). The Court quoted article 1, section 2 and article 1, section 3
of the California Constitution. Id. at 79-80 n.2. "Every person may freely speak, write
and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this
right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 2. "[P]eople have the right to... petition government for redress of grievances...
CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
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time they enter the grid. If that is the case, then Linden Lab may not
abridge rights granted under the California Constitution.
63
In sum, protection for civil liberties granted by the Federal Consti-
tution is generally only mandated when the forum is a "state actor,"
an entity that provides a public function, traditionally and exclusively
reserved to the government. A privately owned and operated town
(or a private entity that is the equivalent to the business district of a
town) qualifies as a state actor, but a privately owned shopping center
does not. I contend that Second Life qualifies as a state actor be-
cause, to its residents, it is at least as much of a municipality as
Chickasaw was in Marsh. Consider Justice Black's discussion in his
Logan Valley dissent of why Marsh was a state actor (compared with a
shopping mall): "Marsh dealt with the very special situation of a
company-owned town, complete with streets, alleys, sewers, stores,
residences, and everything else that goes to make a town." 4 Linden
Lab provides the infrastructure of every aspect of the Second Life
community that is not created by the residents themselves.
Nevertheless, even if the forum is not a state actor, it may still be
required to afford rights to patrons that exist under the relevant state
constitution. In this case, if it can be said that the Second Life com-
63 Of course, with regard to a private actor like Second Life there will be an additional
analysis here as to what state would have proper jurisdiction. Jurisdiction for virtual
communities has been addressed by other authors, and is certainly unresolved, but, in
any event, lies beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Lastowka & Hunter, supra note
18, at 68-72 (discussing the notion of a separate jurisdiction for cyberspace). It is worth
noting that the Second Life Terms of Service specify that California Law will apply in any
disputes. See Second Life: Terms of Service, supra note 39, § 7.1 ("This Agreement and
the relationship between you and Linden Lab shall be governed in all respects by the laws
of the State of California without regard to conflict of law principles or the United Na-
tions Convention on the International Sale of Goods."); id. General Provisions ("The
rights and obligations of the parties under this Agreement shall not be governed by the
U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods; rather such rights and
obligations shall be governed by and construed under the laws of the State of California,
including its Uniform Commercial Code, without reference to conflict of laws princi-
ples.").
64 391 U.S. at 330-31 (Black, J., dissenting). See also Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 851 (1976) (listing some examples of traditional public functions, including "fire
prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation"), over-
ruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Second Life
doesn't exactly have fires, but there have been other disasters in which the company has
taken the role of state actor and intervened to prevent public calamity, either by banning
so-called "griefers" (users who try to create chaos on the grid) or by altering the architec-
ture of the system to prevent "malware" attacks. See, e.g., Glyn Moody, The Duplicitous In-
habitants of Second Life, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 23, 2006, at 5 (Technology Pages) (dis-
cussing the "gray goo" attack on Second Life and Linden Lab's plan to address the
problem).
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munity is located in California, then its residents are due the protec-
tions afforded to them by the California Constitution.
III. THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON INTEREST, AND THE LIMITS OF
CONTRACT
Although (like a mall or town) Second Life is free to visit,61 Sec-
ond Lifers are required to agree to Terms of Service and to abide by a
set of "Community Standards, 66 before being allowed to live, work,
and play in the virtual world. This Section will address the extent to
which contracts imposed on closed communities may limit the civil
liberties of parties to those agreements. Can Second Lifers sign away
their civil rights? What actions, though acceptable under the Terms,
would be held unconstitutional as a matter of federal or California
state law?
Second Life's Terms of Service specify that California law ap-
plies.67 Among other provisions, the Terms also specify that:
" "Linden Lab may suspend or terminate your account at any
time, without refund or obligation to you.
6
" "Linden Lab retains ownership of the account and related data,
regardless of intellectual property rights you may have in con-
tent you create or otherwise own. 69
65 There are no costs to register or to download the Second Life software.
66 In "Community Standards," Linden sets out a list of six intolerable behaviors (the "Big
Six") "that will result in suspension or, with repeated violations, expulsion from the Sec-
ond Life Community." They fall under the general headings of intolerance, harassment,
assault, disclosure, indecency, and disturbing the peace, and are the sorts of things that
would subject one to criminal or civil sanctions in most traditional physical-world socie-
ties. See Second Life, Community Standards, http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php
(last visited Oct. 9, 2007). In fact, Second Life is remarkably tolerant, probably more
than most municipalities, as it provides specific "mature" areas where virtually anything
goes. In those areas, residents may even engage in explicit sexual behavior without any
fear of reprisal from Second Life's proprietors. The community as a whole is intended
for adults, and a separate Second Life "grid" is available for teens (13 to 18), where there
are no "mature" areas and a somewhat more restrictive set of community standards. See
Teen Second Life, http://teen.secondlife.com; Teen Second Life Community Standards,
http://teen.secondlife.com/footer/cs/.
67 Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 39, General Provisions. Note that Second Life
changed its TOS to make arbitration optional after a federal court recently held a previ-
ous mandatory arbitration clause to be unconscionable. See infra text accompanying note
90.
68 Second Life, Terms of Service, supra note 39, § 2.6.
69 Id. § 3.3.
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* 'You agree to abide by certain rules of conduct, including the
Community Standards and other rules prohibiting illegal and
other practices that Linden Lab deems harmful.,
70
" "All data on Linden Lab's servers are subject to deletion, altera-
tion or transfer.,
71
Taken together, the provisions above suggest that, from Linden's
perspective, the company can seize any virtual assets acquired by Sec-
ond Life residents and may expel anyone, for any reason, at any
time-essentially take one's virtual property without compensation or
due process of law. This has provoked disputes like the one in theS 71
case of Bragg v. Linden discussed earlier.
In the physical world, disputes over restrictive residential associa-
tion rules have arisen over, inter alia, the ability of homeowners to
display signs 73 and the American flag. 74  In the absence ofdslypolitical gsadteA ia lg s eo
state legislation explicitly limiting homeowners' association agree-
ments, 75 the analysis generally takes the same form as that for private
towns and shopping centers discussed above.
70 Id. § 4.1.
71 Id. § 5.3. This provision also notes that:
When using the Service, you may accumulate Content, Currency, objects, items,
scripts, equipment, or other value or status indicators that reside as data on Lin-
den Lab's servers. THESE DATA, AND ANY OTHER DATA, ACCOUNT
HISTORY AND ACCOUNT NAMES RESIDING ON LINDEN LAB'S SERVERS,
MAY BE DELETED, ALTERED, MOVED OR TRANSFERRED AT ANY TIME FOR
ANY REASON IN LINDEN LAB'S SOLE DISCRETION. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING ANY COPYRIGHT OR OTHER RIGHTS YOU
MAY HAVE WITH RESPECT TO ITEMS YOU CREATE USING THE SERVICE,
AND NOTWITHSTANDING ANY VALUE ATTRIBUTED TO SUCH CONTENT
OR OTHER DATA BY YOU OR ANY THIRD PARTY, LINDEN LAB DOES NOT
PROVIDE OR GUARANTEE, AND EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS (SUBJECT TO ANY
UNDERLYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE CONTENT), ANY
VALUE, CASH OR OTHERWISE, ATTRIBUTED TO ANY DATA RESIDING ON
LINDEN LAB'S SERVERS. YOU UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT LINDEN
LAB HAS THE RIGHT, BUT NOT THE OBLIGATION, TO REMOVE ANY
CONTENT (INCLUDING YOUR CONTENT) IN WHOLE OR IN PART AT ANY
TIME FOR ANY REASON OR NO REASON, WITH OR WITHOUT NOTICE
AND WITH NO LIABILITY OF ANY KIND.
Id.
72 Supra note 35 and accompanying text.
73 See generally Lisa J. Chadderdon, No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments,
Homeowners Associations, and Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 233, 240
(2006) (considering whether, given the prevalence and proliferation of common interest
developments, "restrictions on political speech in [homeowners associations] constitute
an infringement of First Amendment free speech rights").
74 See generally Elizabeth F. Grussenmeyer, The Right to Display the American Flag in Common
Interest Developments: Restrictions by Homeowners' Associations Not Tolerated, 34 McGEORGE L.
REV. 516 (2003) (reviewing rights and legislation addressing the display of the flag).
75 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 434.5(b)(1) (West 2007) ("No person, private entity, or gov-
ernmental agency shall adopt any rule, regulation, or ordinance, or enter into any
[Vol. 10:1
THE ULTIMATE COMPANY TOWN
Where there is state action, there can be no abridgement of con-
stitutional rights. Of course, community associations, though private,
may take on the properties of a state actor.76 "The size and the char-
acter of a common interest community can blur the distinction be-
tween public and private. So too can the association's roles and re-
sponsibilities. '' 77  Furthermore, even if the association is not
considered a state actor, unconstitutional rules may not be upheld in
litigation because the court is a state actor.7s
There is no reason to believe Linden Lab would keep people from
exercising their free speech rights. There have been documented
protest activities, as in July 2003 when residents objected to "Linden
Lab's policy of taxing residents for objects they create. 79 Second Lif-
ers "dress[ed] in colonial garb and cover[ed] the land with giant tea
crates and defiant signs that read 'Born free: Taxed to Death.'
8 0
The tax was abolished in November 2003 and Linden Lab granted in-
tellectual property rights to residents for their creations. Neverthe-
less, it is hard to predict whether policies might change in the future
with an influx of less-tolerant residents and major commercial inter-
ests that will undoubtedly press for limits on expression that threat-
ens their business.
The biggest problem for Second Life at the moment seems to be
the concern about due process. If a resident is expelled from Second
Life, his or her virtual property is subject to confiscation without
agreement or covenant, that prevents any person or private entity that would otherwise
have the legal right to display a Flag of the United States on private property from exer-
cising that right, unless it is used as, or in conjunction with, an advertising display." (em-
phasis omitted)).
76 See Verna v. Links at Valleybrook Neighborhood Ass'n, 852 A.2d 202, 214 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2004) ("For many Californians, the homeowners association functions as a sec-
ond municipal government." (citation omitted)); David J. Kennedy, Note, Residential Asso-
ciations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE
L.J. 761, 764, 787-89 (1995) (discussing the public function test in the context of residen-
tial associations, concluding that there is "little consensus" among state courts as to
whether the associations are state actors, and arguing that "[i]f residential associations
are able to exercise the powers associated with serving a public function, they must also
shoulder the responsibilities").
77 WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION LAw 61 (3d ed. 2000).
78 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18 (1948) (refusing to allow state agents to enforce
restrictive covenants based on race).
79 Wired Travel Guide, supra note 17 (presenting some notable events in the history of Sec-
ond Life).
80 Id.
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compensation.8 ' This would clearly abridge the Fourteenth Amend-
ment were Second Life to be considered a state actor.
Naturally this would never pass muster in the physical world.
Imagine an analogous, pitiable family who is kicked out of their resi-
dential community for having a dog weighing more than 25 pounds.
Upon coming home one day, the security guard refuses to open the
palatial gate and informs them that their house and all the property
within it has been seized, with no mind to the investment that has
been made in its development and upkeep. Clearly a municipality
would not be able to do such a thing because it would be a state ac-
tor, and such a deprivation of property without due process violates
the Fourteenth Amendment."2
Linden Lab has asserted that Second Life is "owned by its resi-
dents. '8 3 So what happens when the property is seized by Second Life
or others without due process? A number of observers have ques-
tioned the effectiveness of End-User Licensing Agreements (EULAs)
like Second Life's "Terms of Service" agreement. "It is not clear to
anyone outside the legal system whether the EULAs, as currently writ-
ten, will be robust to the challenges that will likely ensue." 4 One of
the prime arguments is that EULAs apply a double standard where
virtual property has real-world value but cannot be affected by real-
world laws related to theft, taxation, or civil rights.
8 5
Beyond that, such expansive EULAs may be invalid as a matter of
contract law.8 6 More consideration by the courts will be necessary to
81 See Terms of Service, supra note 39, 67-71 and accompanying text. This is what allegedly
happened in the pending Bragg v. Linden Research case, supra note 35.
82 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
83 What is Second Life?, http://secondlife.com/whatis/ (last visited July 16, 2007). Note
that although language suggesting ownership beyond intellectual property rights has
since been removed from the Second Life site, Linden Lab's representatives are well
documented as stating that Second Life residents "own" their property. Furthermore,
language regarding ownership on the Second Life site is not restricted to discussions of
copyrights and trademarks. See, e.g., Second Life, Own Virtual Land, http://secondlife.
com/whatis/land.php (last visited Oct. 24, 2007) ("Owning land in Second Life allows
you to build, display, and store your virtual creations, as well as host events and busi-
ness.").
84 Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 185, 196 (2004).
85 See id. at 198 (citing Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 18).
86 See David P. Sheldon, Comment, Claiming Ownership, but Getting Owned: Contractual Limita-
tions on Asserting Property Interests in Virtual Goods, 54 UCLA L. REV. 751, 776-82 (2007) (re-
viewing ways that virtual-world participants might "protect their interests in virtual items
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determine just how far user agreements may go. Although waiver of
First Amendment rights is well established,8 7 a contract may neverthe-
less be void for other reasons. Waiver of rights must be "knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent."' 8 A contract may also be void if it involves
one party violating the law, or if it is contrary to public policy.8 9 Ar-
guably, any non-negotiable agreement that pressures users to forfeit
any virtual property they may own at the whim of Second Life's pro-
prietors is antithetical to property protections (and related liberties)
assured by the Constitution. In fact, a federal court has already
deemed Second Life's Terms of Service a "contract of adhesion,"
finding the arbitration clause (at least) procedurally and substantively
unconscionable (and thus unenforceable). go
In sum, it is by no means certain that Second Life would be im-
mune from any constitutional claims simply because it was not classi-
fied as a company-town-style state actor. A private common interest
community still has important obligations to its residents and certain
terms in EULAs may be unenforceable or void as a matter of contract
law.
by attacking the terms of the EULAs under contract theories" such as unconscionability
or reliance/promissory estoppel).
87 Peter S. Jenkins, The Virtual World as a Company Town-Freedom of Speech in Massively Multi-
ple On-Line Role Playing Games, 8J. OF INTERNET LAW 1, 10 (2004) (noting that typical users
may not be sufficiently knowledgeable to waive their rights by clicking 'I agree' on a vir-
tual-world EULA).
88 Id. (citing D.H. Overmyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972)).
89 See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:1 (discussing illegal bargains and agreements void as
against public policy); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 ("When a
Term is Unenforceable on Grounds of Public Policy.").
90 Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 606-11 (E.D. Pa. 2007). With regard
to procedural unconscionability, the court explained that
although the TOS are ubiquitous throughout Second Life, Linden buried the
TOS's arbitration provision in a lengthy paragraph under the benign heading
'GENERAL PROVISIONS.' Linden also failed to make available the costs and
rules of arbitration in the ICC by either setting them forth in the TOS or by pro-
viding a hyperlink to another page or website where they are available.
Id. at 606-07 (citations omitted). As for substantive unconscionability, the court noted
that "a number of the TOS's elements" led to that conclusion, including "lack of mutual-
ity," one-sidedness of the costs involved, unreasonable arbitration venue and confidential-
ity provisions, and an insufficient "legitimate business realities" justification for the TOS's
one-sidedness. Id. at 607-11. Linden has since modified its Terms of Service Agreement,
providing a section clearly marked "Dispute Resolution" above the "General Provisions"
section. The new section provides for governing law (California), forum for disputes
(San Francisco, California), optional arbitration (giving claimants the choice of arbitra-
tion when seeking awards less than $10,000), and "improperly filed claims" (allowing re-
covery of attorneys' fees for claims bought contrary to the dispute resolution section).
Terms of Service, supra note 39.
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IV. VIRTUAL WORLDS AS STATE ACTORS (OR NOT)
Should citizens of virtual worlds expect to have rights? Relatively
few legal scholars have examined the role of law in virtual communi-
ties and those who have have adopted varying opinions as to the gen-
eral availability of civil rights for citizens of those communities.
As an initial matter, we must first address the common objection
to the legitimacy of granting rights to arguably fictional identities. It
is easy enough to argue that commodification of virtual communities
has made it clear that Second Life is not merely "a game." But a
more difficult challenge to surmount is the problem that the Consti-
tution protects "people," not fictitious representations of people.
Identities established in Second Life or other virtual communities are
not "real," so how can they be entitled to civil liberties? One re-
sponse might be that each virtual identity is simply an extension of
the person who has directed its development. But one human could
have several virtual identities-or, for that matter, one virtual identity
could have been developed and transferred among various human
operators. Whose rights should be protected? An alternative re-
sponse is to point to the corporation, another fictitious entity that has
been recognized by the law and accorded rights for nearly four cen-
turies. 91 Similarly, the jurisdictional concept of "domicile" has been
raised to suggest that an individual may be legitimately seen as "liv-
ing" in a place he or she does not physically occupy."2 "If a corpora-
tion, which has no physical body.., can be said to be domiciled in a
certain location, then certainly [one] who is directly manifested in
the [virtual world] by his avatar, can be said to be domiciled in the
[virtual world], especially if the player operating the avatar spends
more time in the [virtual world] than anywhere else., 93 Thus, there
appears to be no prima facie reason why a fictional entity should not
be entitled to rights. 94 Let us return, then, to the question of whether
91 See Castronova, supra note 84, at 188 ("There was a moment some 400 years ago when this
set of fantastical rules-defining who or what could be a fictional person and how that
fictional person would be treated-seemed sensible to large numbers of serious people.
Since then, few have been troubled by this collective fantasy.").
92 Jenkins, supra note 87.
93 Id.
94 If the question of whether the law recognizes virtual persons requires some argument, the
analogous question of whether the law recognizes intangible "virtual property" appears
well settled by disputes over many varieties of abstract property interests, from financial
securities to intellectual property to frequent-flyer miles. See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 52
P.3d 724, 731 (Alaska 2002) (holding that Alaska Airlines miles, despite being non-
transferable, constituted marital property subject to valuation for purposes of property
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Second Life should be considered a state actor that is prohibited
from denying the rights due to such fictitious entities.
There is no consensus in the scholarly literature whether virtual
world residents should be entitled to rights, or whether they (and
their virtual property) exist purely at the whim of virtual world pro-
prietors. Authors who favor limiting the rights of virtual world resi-
dents in favor of stronger proprietor control have typically argued
that the Constitution simply does not apply to virtual worlds because
they do not qualify as state actors. They go on to either argue that
the law should not get involved with what is essentially a private
"game,"9 5 or that because of the property rights involved, the law will
get involved, but not on the basis of any constitutional mandate.96
Others contend that users' rights should be protected, but by self-
imposed rules developed by virtual world proprietors. 97 A few believe
that it probably makes sense to find state action in virtual worlds. 9s I
agree with this latter group, and suggest that the Constitution (either
state or federal) clearly does apply, or clearly will apply before too
long as usage expands and technology improves. I take the position
that Second Life should be considered a state actor under the public
function doctrine, that the rationale for this continues to strengthen
with Second Life's success, and thus Second Life must offer constitu-
tional rights to its citizens, as would any virtual world that aims to
mimic a municipality or common-interest community. Furthermore,
division); see also Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d at 593 (raising no ques-
tion as to the legitimacy of the plaintiffs virtual property). It is unnecessary to review
disputes over the applicability of the Takings Clause to revocation of flight miles or credit
card points because, contrary to the thesis of this Comment, there can be little argument
that card issuers or airlines are "state actors."
95 See Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 19, 42-44 (2004) (opining that if courts were to grant property rights to game
players uninvited by the administrators, it would "ultimately lead[] to [the game's] stran-
gulation").
96 See Jack M. Balkin, Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63 (2004)
[hereinafter Balkin, Law and Liberty] (noting that although "the right of players to play in
virtual worlds and the right of game designers to create and maintain these worlds over-
lap in important respects with the constitutional rights of freedom of speech, expression,
and association," they are not within the scope of the First Amendment because the First
Amendment only protects against state action).
97 See Castronova, supra note 84, at 209 (stating that in closed virtual worlds the presence of
an End User Licensing Agreement is enough to protect the rights of players).
98 See, e.g., Jenkins, supra note 87 (agreeing with the proposition that constitutional speech
protections will be granted to residents of virtual worlds); Lastowka & Hunter, supra note
18, at 60-61 (noting the likelihood of increased agitation for application of the state ac-
tion doctrine to virtual worlds).
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I suggest that the more "life-like" the virtual community is, the more
those rights should apply.
One advocate of strong rights for virtual world proprietors (and
not for virtual world residents) is Richard Bartle, a professor of Elec-
tronic Systems Engineering, and a developer of the original "MUD
("Multi-User Dungeon") ... the world's first virtual world."" He con-
tends that virtual world proprietors must be able to develop the rule
of virtual worlds, and that they "have carte blanche to change the vir-
tual world however they deem appropriate, regardless of the will of
the players . . . ,"' This is necessary, he argues, in order for the ad-
ministrators to "protect the game conceit."'' Bartle also believes the
commodification of virtual worlds-the application of "real-world"
value to virtual objects and property-poses a risk to virtual worlds
because it invites the legal system to limit the power of game adminis-
trators.' 2 Although he gives lip service to the idea that virtual worlds
continue to develop, and that "[t]hey're not games, they're places,"'
0 3
it appears that Bartle is conceptualizing virtual worlds as nothing
more than pure constructions of game developers for the sole pur-
pose of entertainment.'°4 Not being a legal scholar, he appears wary
of the involvement of courts and the need to establish property
rights. Unfortunately, this denies the true potential of the seed he
helped to plant and favors the rights of virtual world administrators
over the lives that now exist in MUD's progenies. As Bartle says, "the
more virtual worlds there are, the better,"0 5 and there may be room
for authoritarian virtual communities where property can be seized at
will and disfavored speech may be summarily silenced. This sort of
virtual society, however, is not the one embodied by Second Life, and
to the extent a virtual community styles itself as "free," it should be
distinguished from the "games" whose conceit Bartle is so interested
in protecting.
Eric Goldman also argues against providing speech rights for resi-
dents of virtual worlds, suggesting that they are no different from
99 Bartle, supra note 95, at 20. Note that the MUD acronym was later explained to stand for
"Multi-User Domain" when use of the nascent virtual world technology expanded beyond
the fantasy gaming context.
100 Id. at 34.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 36 (observing that when a judge modifies the power of the administrator in a
virtual world, it changes that world in a fundamental way).
103 Id. at 44.
104 Id. at 43-44 (describing the integral nature of characteristics such as game conceits, lev-
els, and achievement structures to virtual worlds).
105 Id. at 43.
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other online providers, like CompuServe and America Online, which
"courts so far have unanimously held.., are not state actors for First
Amendment purposes."'' 0 6 Goldman examines the arguments in favor
of distinguishing virtual communities from other online providers
(immersion, commoditization, and investment/switching costs), and
dismisses them.0 7 Rather, he argues, virtual communities simply en-
courage participants to fantasize that their online lives are "real," that
virtual assets are governed by contract law under the terms of the
community's EULA, and that investment in virtual property is a bad
thing that makes it difficult for newcomers to enter a community.' 8
Goldman's strongest argument is that deeming virtual communities
state actors would unintentionally limit free speech because virtual
community proprietors would then have more responsibilities and
less incentive to invest.' 9 A counterargument is that plenty of busi-
nesses are still financially attractive to investors despite the fact that
they must respect freedom of speech mandates. Goldman compares
virtual communities to earlier online service providers (e.g., Prodigy)
that were given blanket protection by the Communications Decency
Act (CDA).' 10 Although it is true that services like Second Life should
be protected under the CDA for anything residents may say (e.g., de-
famatory speech), it does not address whether a virtual community
should be considered a state actor, forbidden from abridging rights
to which its citizens are entitled. To be sure, early online communi-
ties like AOL, CompuServe, and Prodigy shared features with Second
Life, in that people used the service to communicate with other peo-
ple and established online relationships and identities in "communi-
ties" revolving around chat rooms and bulletin board forums. How-
106 Eric Goldman, Speech Showdowns at the Virtual Corral, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 845 (2005) (evaluating the censorship outcry after a Sims Online user's account
was terminated for publicly exposing an online "cyber-prostitution" ring in the virtual
community); see, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015,
1025-27 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that CompuServe was not a public utility and thus
Cyber Promotions enjoyed no special privilege to use CompuServe's proprietary com-
puter system); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 441, 444-45
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that America Online was a private company and was not per-
forming an exclusive public function, was not acting in concert with state officials, and
was not ajoint participant with the state).
107 Goldman, supra note 106, at 848-51.
108 Id. Of course, one could argue that the challenge to newcomers in going up against heav-
ily invested incumbents is in fact quite similar to the physical world we all live in.
109 Id. at 851.
110 See id. at 852 (describing section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 230 (2000), as "grant[ing] online providers a near-blanket immunity from liability for
their users' content").
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ever, these early communities were simply forums for communica-
tion, not virtual spaces with freedom to create, own, and transfer
property. Even the earliest avatar-based forums, like The Palace,"'
were simply fora for synchronous online interaction-nothing like
the rich simulacra of life embodied by the virtual worlds of today. No
one would argue that a collection of chat rooms amounted to public
functions traditionally reserved exclusively for government. AOL
never called its users "residents." But Second Life offers everything
that one would expect to find in a real town-and more.
Jack Balkin takes a more pragmatic approach to virtual communi-
ties, suggesting that virtual worlds like Second Life may or may not be
seen as "company-town" state actors, but that ultimately the law will
get involved either way because of commodification (attaching real-
world value to virtual goods)."' He has posited that there are three
kinds of virtual liberty: (1) the freedom of "players" to participate
and interact in the virtual world; (2) the freedom of the platform
owner to design (plan, construct, and maintain) the virtual world;
and (3) "the collective right of the designers and the players to build
and enhance the game space together."'1 3  Balkin's primary argu-
ments are: (1) that the First Amendment should protect against the
government's intrusion into activities of players and game design-
ers;1 1 4 (2) that tort law may be applicable to activity in virtual
worlds;1 5 and (3) that "courts, legislatures, and administrative agen-
cies [may] start treating virtual items as property," to the extent that
platform owners "encourage people... to treat virtual items like
property, and allow sale and purchase of these assets as if they were
111 The Palace was an interactive computer service established in 1996 where users could log
into chat rooms and interact by moving small pictures (avatars) around. Typed text
would appear in comic-book-like bubbles near their avatars. See Wikipedia, The Palace,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ThePalace-%28computer-program%29 (discussing the
history of the Palace).
112 SeeJack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in Virtual Worlds, 90
VA. L. REv. 2043, 2046-47 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Virtual Liberty] (asserting that when
.game owners encourage people to treat elements in the virtual world like real-world
property, and allow purchase of those assets in real-world markets," the First Amendment
should not shield them from government regulation).
113 See Balkin, Law and Liberty, supra note 96, at 64.
114 Id. at 71 ("Both platform owners and players can assert First Amendment rights against
state interference with rights to design and play.").
115 Id. at 73-76 (including trademark violations, defamation, misrepresentation, and inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress).
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property." "6 Most importantly for the purposes of the present discus-
sion, Balkin maintains, "First Amendment law does not protect the
interests of the game players against the actions of the platform
owner or game designer because the platform owner is not a state ac-
tor." " 7 Although he acknowledges that a virtual world could be seen
as a Marsh-style "company town," he distinguishes the virtual commu-
nity in that: (1) unlike Marsh, virtual community residents may still
communicate with one another outside the virtual world; (2) unlike
Marsh, virtual world residents do not have to live in the company
town in order to make a living; and (3) not all virtual worlds are the
same, or uniformly created for the purpose of "creat[ing] channels
for general public communication.""1 8 In the two years since Balkin
wrote, his anticipated objections to the company town analogy have
(as he anticipated) grown weaker. People are conducting important
activities and establishing occupations in virtual worlds. We are ap-
proaching a time where one will not have the choice to avoid partici-
pating in Second Life (or something like it) any more than we can
decide not to participate in the Internet. Students enrolled in Har-
vard Law's CyberOne course" 9 were required to appear in Second Life,
and organizers of more important meetings (business, government,
social, et cetera) are selecting Second Life as the locale of choice.
1 20
The increasing number of Second Life residents who depend on it to
make a living are not required to be there any less than the Marsh
employees were (they could have moved and found different jobs).
Finally, Second Life is a perfect example of the sort of community that
is intended to be a channel for open communication. Although
communication among Second Life residents is possible outside Sec-
ond Life, the Marsh standard is not set so high (after all, Chickasaw's
residents could have communicated by other means, had they
wished).
Edward Castronova takes another pragmatic perspective. He pre-
sumes that EULAs are probably not enforceable under the law but
that new "Laws of Interration" should be enacted to facilitate the
creation of closed "play spaces," that would have limited sovereignty
116 Id. at 78 (arguing that platform owners "cannot have it both ways... simultaneously en-
courag[ing] the purchase and sale of virtual items and then writ[ing] the EULA so that
all virtual items remain the property of the platform owner").
117 Balkin, Virtual Liberty, supra note 112, at 2074-75.
118 Id. at 2078-79.
119 See supra note 27.
120 See, e.g., Athavaley, supra note 31 (discussingjob interviews held in Second Life).
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and be completely self regulated. 2' Closed worlds would be required
to adhere to strict rules (as are corporations) to ensure their proper
separation as play spaces.122  For example, assets in closed worlds
would be restricted from commodification.' 23 Open virtual spaces, by
contrast, would have a "completely porous" border with the real
world. All real-world laws would apply and conflicts would be re-
solved in traditional courts.12  Presumably, Second Life would con-
tinue to operate as the showcase "open" world that it has become un-
der Castronova's scheme.
In perhaps the most pragmatic and prescient article, from a de-
velopmental standpoint, F. Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter have
predicted that finding state action in virtual worlds will be resisted at
first, but that the public will continue to argue for it, given the in-
creasing investment in aspects of our lives that are carried out in vir-
tual spaces.' 25 Thus, they suggest, it is only a matter of time before
citizens expect the same liberties that they have in privately owned
towns and shopping malls. '
26
As people increasingly come to live and work in these worlds, the domi-
nation of legal property issues by EULAs and practices of "wizardly fiat"
may appear one-sided and unjust. If corporate wizards continue to assert
complete ownership over virtual lives, cyborg inhabitants will bring their
concerns to real-world courts to prevent certain fundamental rights from
being contracted away. If constitutional speech protections extend to
company towns like Chickasaw, Alabama, it seems likely that such rights
121 See Castronova, supra note 84, at 201-02 (envisioning closed worlds where the interests
and conditions of users are regulated by the terms of the EULA and where Earth courts
and legislatures have no powers).
122 Id. at 204 (noting also that "lack of good faith efforts to maintain the space as a play space
could lead to the revocation of the charter").
123 See id. at 204 n.25 (discussing the need to ban certain eBay transactions for virtual goods).
Note also that eBay eventually did ban real-money trading in January 2007, "citing,
among other concerns, the customer-service issues involved in facilitating transactions
that are prohibited by the gaming companies." Dibbell, supra note 32, at 38. However, by
the time eBay banned such sales, the bulk of such transactions were being facilitated
through "high-volume online specialty sites like the virtual-money superstores IGE, Bro-
Game and Massive Online Gaming Sales ... the Wal-Marts and Targets of this decidedly
gray market... ." Id.
124 See Castronova, supra note 84, at 202 (discussing open worlds where "[t]he interests and
conditions of users are regulated by applicable real-world law in whatever jurisdiction the
users and world-servers find themselves").
125 See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 18, at 60-62.
126 See id. at 61 (posing the question, "if members of our society are uncomfortable with limi-
tations upon speech in company towns and shopping malls, how will we feel about speech
limitations placed on entire (virtual) worlds?").
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will be asserted by, and eventually granted to those who live in virtual
worlds. 27
Lastowka and Hunter's conclusion has been echoed by Peter S.
Jenkins. 28 Jenkins extends the state action argument by focusing on
the lived experiences of participants in virtual worlds and taking a
closer look at the "informed citizen" rationale in Marsh.'29 One of the
considerations in Marsh was that even though Chickasaw was a private
town, it needed to allow for free speech because its residents had no
other outlet to receive diverse viewpoints.'30 Jenkins considers the
notion that Marsh does not apply because virtual citizens have other
outlets for receiving information, and by virtue of the Internet, have
even more access to diverse, uncensored viewpoints than usual.'3 ' He
notes that recent scholarship acknowledges that the Internet, and the
availability of an unlimited amount of information, has led, not to
more diversity, but less, because individuals "sort themselves into digi-
tal deliberative enclaves together with those who share the same
viewpoints (cyberbalkanization), often with the result that the group
arrives at a more extreme conclusion than the majority of its mem-
bers each individually held prior to joining the group."'' 32 Thus, Jen-
kins argues, virtual citizens in fact need more assurance of free speech
because they are not likely to receive diverse viewpoints on their own.
Jenkins goes on to distinguish virtual worlds from Marsh progeny
cases like Hudgens v. NLRB, noting (as I did above) that virtual worlds
are more like towns than shopping malls given the extent to which
they are "lived in" by their "residents."'33  It is further irrelevant, he
notes, that unlike Second Lifers and other virtual community citizens,
127 Id. at 72.
128 SeeJenkins, supra note 87 ("Although I do not agree with all of [Lastowka and Hunter's]
reasoning, I certainly do agree with their conclusion.").
129 Id. at 11-13.
130 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946) ("Many people in the United States
live in company-owned towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free
citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citizens they must make decisions
which affect the welfare of community and nation. To act as good citizens they must be
informed. In order to enable them to be properly informed their information must be
uncensored. There is no more reason for depriving these people of the liberties guaran-
teed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms
with respect to any other citizen.").
131 Jenkins, supra note 87, at 11.
132 Id. (citing the work of Cass Sunstein at the University of Chicago). Another Chicago fac-
ulty member, Judge Richard Posner, expressed a similar argument in a recent article
evaluating increasing polarization in the news media. See Richard A. Posner, Bad News,
N.Y. TIMEs, July 31, 2005, at 1 (book review) (arguing that competition and the rise of
blogs has led to political polarization across all news media).
133 Jenkins, supra note 87, at 12.
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the residents in Marsh were employed by the owner of their town,
Gulf Shipbuilding. What mattered to the Supreme Court was not
who employed the citizens, but the public function provided by the
proprietors and the ability of citizens to access information without
censorship. '3
The past two to three years since the burst of virtual world legal
scholarship, which emerged from the first State of Play conference in
2003,13 have only seen an increase in virtual world usage, and a main-
streaming of the field, with a high level of attention in the popular
media. Technology continues to improve, and Second Life has
emerged as a prototypical virtual world that aims to be about as "real"
as one can get. Take the wizards and ogres out of the system, add a
legitimate currency exchange, and you end up with something that
looks like the quintessential company town. This does not seem to
faze Linden Lab CEO Philip Rosedale, who acknowledges the in-
creasing role that real-world law will play in his creation. 16
I agree with those who suggest that virtual worlds will bring the
Marsh decision back into the forefront of state action jurisprudence.
Although federal law has restricted the doctrine over the years, re-
quiring the private actor to control functions traditionally provided
exclusively by the government, the federal courts will again need to
confront state action and company towns because virtual worlds are
so ripe for diversity of citizenship litigation (parties generally being
from different parts of the country-or the world). As discussed
above, the initial rulings may come from California where state action
is not necessary to provide liberties under the state constitution. But
once it has been established that a virtual world must provide some
constitutional freedoms, it will be a short step to find that the same
freedoms apply under our Federal Constitution as well.
134 See id. at 14 (discussing the importance of forum classification in deciding First Amend-
ment cases).
135 See Noveck, supra note 18, at 4 ("This special Symposium issue of the New York Law School
Law Review grows out of the first annual State of Play Conference, held at New York Law
School from November 13-15, 2003. The State of Play, organized by the Information So-
ciety Project at Yale Law School and the Institute for Information Law and Policy at New
York Law School, brought together leading legal scholars and practitioners with game de-
signers and software industry professionals, as well as cognitive psychologists, communica-
tions experts, computer scientists, visual artists, and game players to explore the new
frontier of cyberspace: the virtual world."). The conference continues today. See State of
Play IV: Building the Global Metaverse, http://www.nyls.edu/pages/2396.asp (last visited
Oct. 9, 2007).
136 See supra notes 17, 39.
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What is most certain is that the issue will arise in greater force,
with a flood of litigation as more businesses and private individuals
begin to interact in places like Second Life. Practically speaking, it
may be wise to consider Castronova's suggestion that government get
involved sooner rather than later and have Congress fashion laws that
will establish "closed" virtual worlds where the law cannot apply and
"open" virtual worlds (like Second Life) where the law affirmatively
does apply. 137 Although gainers and virtual world proprietors might
flock to the former, enterprise will flock to the latter, where the rules
are affirmatively clear, as will consumers looking for more than a
good time. Such individuals are likely to prefer an environment
where their financial investments-and ights-will be protected.
13
8
Fortunately, Congress has taken the first steps in examining the tax
consequences of virtual property transactions.139 Once it establishes
guidelines for property (as it must), then the foundation will be laid
for addressing civil liberties.
V. THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF VIRTUAL TOWNS AND
VIRTUAL CITIZENS
If, as a matter of law, Second Life must not abridge the rights and
privileges of its residents that are protected under the Federal Consti-
tution (as a state actor), or California's Constitution (even if not a
state actor), and if the Terms of Service are only enforceable to the
extent that they do not violate these rights, then what are the implica-
tions for Second Life residents and their landlord, Linden Lab?
Second Life citizens and anyone considering "moving to" a virtual
world should be informed as to the rights they may or may not have.
Moreover, just as Second Life residents must be aware of their rights,
Linden Lab needs to be aware of the limits of its authority.
137 Castronova, supra note 84, at 200-07. Such efforts might not be limited to the federal
legislature. Enterprising states might consider developing a comprehensive set of fair
laws to govern virtual worlds incorporated there (becoming the "Delaware" of virtual
worlds, so to speak). Personal Conversation with Theodore Ruger, Professor, University
of Pennsylvania Law School, in Philadelphia, Pa. (June 18, 2007).
138 In the absence of an official legal determination that real-world rights are due to virtual
world citizens, they may simply demand them. See, e.g., Ralph Koster, Declaring the Rights
of Players, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW,, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS, supra note 11, at 55,
56-61 (offering a hypothetical "Declaration of the Rights of Avatars").
139 See Luis Salazar, The Virtual Taxman Cometh? Congress Is Examining Whether Gains Made Play-
ing Online Games Should Be Taxed, eCOM. L. & STRATEGY, Dec. 2006, at I (noting that the
Joint Economic Committee of Congress has begun to examine tax issues regarding virtual
economies).
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In some ways Linden Lab is a victim of its own success. The free
virtual society it has created has been so good at mimicking the im-
portant aspects of world we know that it has become a real part of the
world we know-and thus subject to the laws that society has created
to manage the world as we know it. Just as the Constitution created a
society where it was possible to dream up and create such an enter-
prise, the decision to house a virtual world on servers located in the
U.S. makes the residents of a particularly life-like world susceptible to
life-like rules. In becoming aware of the rights it must preserve, Lin-
den Lab can ensure that its Terms of Service are in line with the law.
Furthermore, it can adjust its software architecture to ensure that
such freedoms are protected.140
The likely applicability of the Federal and California Constitutions
make Second Life a better, freer place for its residents and visitors.
Knowing that property is protected against seizure without due proc-
ess will encourage investment in virtual worlds. Knowing that speech
is protected in virtual worlds will encourage the free flow of commu-
nication and transmission of ideas. Furthermore, because constitu-
tional liberties are guaranteed to visiting non-citizens, a virtual
world whose servers are housed in the United States will be a place
where individuals from "less-free" places may participate in the
American experiment,142 learning firsthand the benefits (and chal-
lenges) of our way of life. Conversely, American citizens who partici-
pate in virtual worlds operated from other nations should not assume
140 As Lawrence Lessig has written, "code is law." See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND
OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999) (illustrating ways in which the architecture of cyber-
space can promote or hinder the fundamental values of a society). It may be possible, for
example, to automatically disable user-created scripts that would violate constitutional
mandates.
141 See Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (noting that "[e]ven one whose presence in
this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to... constitutional protec-
tion" from "deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law").
142 Some Second Life citizens have established zones where they are experimenting with
other forms of government as well. See RYMASZEWSKI ET AL., supra note 2, at 34-36 (dis-
cussing, inter alia, the Neualtenburg Projekt, "a democratic republican government with
three branches and a constitution"). It is unclear how the application of constitutional
liberties will affect such sub-communities in Second Life, but there is no apparent reason
why they could not continue to thrive-analogous to the experimental living communi-
ties in the United States today. See also Caroline Bradley & A. Michael Froomkin, Virtual
Worlds, Real Rules: Using Virtual Worlds to Test Legal Rules, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAWS,
GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS, supra note 11, at 227 (suggesting that virtual worlds may
also serve as a proving ground for new legal principles, testing the effects of new ap-
proaches to areas like tort law, taxes, and dispute resolution).
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that they are protected under the constitutional freedoms they take
for granted. This may be a learning experience for them as well.
Why buy wheels when you have wings? The author visits the Second Life Scion Dealership.
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